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3 The theory of deference
3.1 The Canadian connection
Hoexter and O’Regan J
95
 established deference as a prominent topic and principle, 
respectively. In doing so, both Hoexter and O’Regan J drew on Dyzenhaus’s 
conception of “deference as respect”.
96
 His conception of deference as respect 
follows from an attempt to respond to the following questions: “How should judges 
in common law jurisdictions respond to administrative determinations of the law? 
Should they defer to such determinations or evaluate them in accordance with their 
sense of what the right determination should have been?”
97
 
Significantly, he points out that these questions are interwoven with political and 
legal theory.
98
 Therefore, deference in itself cannot necessarily provide guidance; 
deference is a function of political and legal theory and their content needs to be 
articulated before the meaning or viability of deference can even be assessed. 
For example, the question of the constitutional roles for the judiciary and the 
administration requires elaboration before one could determine what an appropriate 
degree of judicial scrutiny might be or whether a dispute is justiciable. 
Dyzenhaus is critical of formalistic arguments for the justification of judicial 
review, such as the ultra vires or common-law justifications,99 because they do not 
assist courts in resolving administrative-law disputes and they do not recognise the 
legitimate place of the public administration in the legal order.
100
 Thus, Dyzenhaus’s 
point of departure is that “the justification of review and guidance on how such 
review should proceed can only be found in a political theory of the rule of law”.
101
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95 the Bato Star case (n 4).
96 Hoexter refers to Dyzenhaus in her seminal article on deference (Hoexter (n 22) 151 n 245) and 
O’Regan J in preferring the word “respect” to “deference” (Bato Star case (n 4) par 46 n 32).
97 Dyzenhaus “The politics of deference: judicial review and democracy” in Taggart (ed) The Province 
of Administrative Law (1997) 279. One should note that these questions are of limited relevance in 
South Africa, since it is not a pure common-law system.
98 Dyzenhaus (n 97) 279.
99 For a critical discussion and comparison of the ultra vires and common law justifications for review, 
see Jowell “Of vires and vacuums: the constitutional context of judicial review” 1999 Public Law 
448.
100 De Ville “Judicial deference and différance: judicial review and the perfect gift” 2006:2 
Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal 41 42-43.
101 De Ville (n 100) 43 (footnote omitted). He has assumed the legal and political stance of an 
anti-positivist and proceduralist democrat (41).
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Dyzenhaus identifies two types of judicial deference, namely “submissive 
deference” and “deference as respect”.
102
 On the one hand, submissive deference is 
based on the Diceyan model of law and “what it requires of judges is that they submit 
to the intention of the legislature, on a positivist understanding of intention”.
103
 On 
the other hand, “[d]eference as respect requires not submission but a respectful 
attention to the reasons offered or which could be offered in support of a decision, 
whether that decision be the statutory decision of the legislature, a judgment of 
another court, or the decision of an administrative agency”.
104
 Furthermore:
“Deference as respect ... provides an ideal which can inform an attempt to rearticulate the 
relationships between the legislature, the courts and the administration in such a way that the courts 
retain a legitimate role as the ultimate authority on the interpretation of law.
 In statutory interpretation, this ideal requires of judges that they determine the intention of the 
statute, not in accordance with the idea that there is some prior (positivistic) fact of the matter, but 
in terms of the reasons that best justify having that statute.”
105
Dyzenhaus explains that this involves judges setting out the best reasoning that 
resulted in the final statute and, where the meaning of legislation is contested, this 
process will contribute to giving meaning to the legislative provisions.
106
 Thus, 
“[w]hen the statute is one that sets up a regulatory regime and a tribunal to decide disputes that may 
arise out of the regime, this interpretative approach requires judges to take the tribunal’s decision 
seriously ... because what they are primarily concerned to do is to find the reasons that best justify 
any decision, whether legislative, administrative or judicial. And, if the court has before it not 
only a statute to interpret, but also a tribunal’s interpretation of that statute, then the tribunal’s 
interpretation makes a difference to the structure of the interpretative context.”
107
Reasons for adopting this “attitude” of judicial deference include the legislature’s 
choice of the tribunal as the primary forum, the relative speed and economy with 
which it can dispose of matters and its possible expertise.
108
 This attitude involves 
treating the tribunal’s reasoning with respect, regardless of the subject matter of the 
reasoning, whether factual or legal, “by asking whether that reasoning did in fact 
and also could in principle justify the conclusion reached”.
109
Finally, the “principle” of deference as respect
“is inherently democratic. It adopts the assumption that what justifies all public power is the ability 
of its incumbents to offer adequate reasons for the decisions which affect those subject to them. The 
difference between mere legal subjects and citizens is the democratic right of the latter to require an 
accounting for acts of public power.”
110
Dyzenhaus’s model of deference is formulated within the Canadian context, 
which has a developed principle of judicial deference. Therefore, it is instructive 
to contextualise deference as respect properly and to this end Mullan has usefully 
considered the exportability of Canadian judicial deference in a critical analysis 
102 Dyzenhaus (n 97) 286.
103 Dyzenhaus (n 97) 286.
104 Dyzenhaus (n 97) 286 (emphasis added). Note that Dyzenhaus does not limit deference to the context 
of judicial pronouncements on administrative action.
105 Dyzenhaus (n 97) 303.
106 Dyzenhaus (n 97) 303.
107 Dyzenhaus (n 97) 303.
108 Dyzenhaus (n 97) 303-304.
109 Dyzenhaus (n 97) 304 (emphasis added).
110 Dyzenhaus (n 97) 305. See also 307.
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of the principle.
111
 Unfortunately, the South African courts have failed even to 
acknowledge the singular context of deference as respect, merely adopting it 
indiscriminately.
Mullan proffers the view that the origins and development
112
 of judicial deference 
in Canada reveal “what in its detail is an indigenous system of judicial review, the 
precise parameters of which are unlikely to commend themselves to the courts 
of other jurisdictions”.
113
 There are common philosophical considerations at the 
foundation of Canadian judicial review, which may be of value to other jurisdictions, 
though.
114
 For example, an increasingly plural legal reality demands respect for 
administrative agencies because such a legal context cannot accommodate courts 
as the supreme authority on all questions of law, fact and the interpretation of law. 
Nevertheless, Mullan notes that factors such as these cannot in themselves justify the 
Canadian version of judicial deference.
115 Deference must be justified by “a coherent 
conception of the proper constitutional role of the courts in relation to statutory 
and prerogative decision-making”.
116
 This reiterates Dyzenhaus’s argument that 
deference is contingent on choices of legal political theory. It is only once these 
choices have been made and a particular conception of the rule of law adopted that 
deference can be explained and justified. Thus, the parameters and objectives of the 
administrative-law relationship are a function of political theory and the rule of law. 
Finally, Mullan indicates that Canadian deference has faced a barrage of criticism,
117
 
so that even their developed and contextual deference remains controversial.
118
3.2 Deference and constitutional supremacy
Dennis Davis attempts to contextualise South African judicial review in the manner 
advocated by Dyzenhaus and Mullan.
119
 With reference to Hunt, Davis says that “the 
central question of a system of administrative law, particularly when located within 
a constitutional dispensation, is ‘what are the proper boundaries to the respective 
powers of different branches of government, and who decides on where those 
boundaries are drawn?’”
120 Deference supposedly provides answers to this question, 
but Davis holds that deference does not and cannot resolve such a question in the 
abstract. Preliminary concerns must be addressed before the content of deference 
can be determined.
111 Mullan “Deference: is it useful outside Canada?” 2006 Acta Juridica 42. One should note that 
Mullan’s article has now been overtaken by developments in Canadian law (see Daly A Theory of 
Deference in Administrative Law: Basis, Application and Scope (2012) 15-17), but, at the very least, 
it sets out the Canadian legal position at the time O’Regan J drew on Dyzenhaus’s work.
112 See Mullan (n 111) 55-56. It is noteworthy here that the attitude towards review assumed by the 
United States supreme court for scrutinising administrative agencies during the “New Deal” is 
foundational to Canadian judicial deference (56). This resonates with Dyzenhaus’s assertion that 
judicial review can be given meaning only on a foundation of political and legal theory.
113 Mullan (n 111) 56.
114 Mullan (n 111) 57-58. 
115 Mullan (n 111) 58.
116 Mullan (n 111) 58.
117 Mullan (n 111) 51-55. Criticism of Canadian deference covers a wide spectrum: deference itself is 
unjustifiable; deference is not applied appropriately; deference should be intensified; etc.
118 This is illustrated by the recent development of Canadian deference; see Daly (n 111) 15-17. However, 
Mullan’s analysis remains relevant, because this is the deference to which Hoexter and O’Regan J 
alluded in citing Dyzenhaus.
119 Davis “To defer and then when? Administrative law and constitutional democracy” 2006 Acta 
Juridica 23-41.
120 Davis (n 119) 23 (footnote omitted).
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Davis argues that the nature of administrative law must be reconciled with the 
relatively new legal context of human rights.
121
 In line with Mullan, this statement 
in itself reveals a choice in political theory that assumes particular significance in a 
legal system of constitutional supremacy.
122 This leads to another question: how are 
courts to reconcile law and politics? Deference is a relatively recent response to this 
question.123 Deference, however, merely leads to a further inquiry, namely, how do 
courts determine an appropriate standard of review in relation to the facts?
124
Davis concludes that, as a matter of positive law, “the concept of deference which 
has earned such enthusiastic judicial mention has not been based on clear principle 
nor on a recognition that administrative law is now located within the context of a 
rights culture”.
125 In other words, the justification for deference required by both 
Dyzenhaus and Mullan has not been satisfied in the South African context.126 In the 
first place, according to Davis judicial review and administrative law in general have 
not been integrated in a rights culture and context as yet. This has implications for 
the very nature of administrative law and therefore, in this sense, administrative-law 
theory is out-dated. Secondly, on Mullan’s interpretation, the constitutional role of 
the courts cannot be determined in isolation: the judiciary’s function is also defined 
in relation to the functions of the other branches, which reiterates the importance of 
the relationship between the branches. Simply put, the judicial role is a function of 
the executive, administrative and legislative functions.
127
3.3 Deference per se 
As mentioned, Mullan indicates that Canadian deference has faced a barrage of 
critique: deference is unjustified, deference is not applied properly and deference 
should be intensified.128 Thus, even the developed and contextual deference that has 
121 Davis (n 119) 25. The advent of human-rights law has resulted in a new dimension for judicial review 
and, by implication, deference that requires serious attention. Jowell states the significance of 
deference, in this context, powerfully: “the most difficult question for the courts in the interpretation 
of the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA) is the extent to which they should defer to Parliament and other 
institutions of government on matters relating to the public interest” (Jowell “Judicial deference: 
servility, civility or institutional capacity” 2003 Public Law 592). See the discussion above on the 
Pillay case (n 84), which suggests that s 33 of the constitution might be applied in a unique manner.
122 s 2 of the constitution.
123 Davis (n 119) 25.
124 Davis (n 119) 33.
125 Davis (n 119) 39. Davis argues that, in South Africa, “a theory of deference fails to capture the positive, 
dialogic role that a court is required to play within the scheme of socio-economic rights”, merely 
entails that courts defer to superior institutional competence in determining socio-economic policy, 
and “within the South African historical context … is far too closely aligned with the jurisprudence 
of apartheid to constitute a model for the transformation of the legal landscape” (Davis “Adjudicating 
the socio-economic rights in the South African constitution: towards ‘deference lite’?” 2006 SAJHR 
301 319-320 (footnote omitted)). See Davis on the different periods of legal development, (n 119) 
24-25.
126 As mentioned, Mullan argues that deference is justified by “a coherent conception of the proper 
constitutional role of the courts in relation to statutory and prerogative decision-making” (Mullan 
(n 111) 58) and Dyzenhaus argues that “the justification of review and guidance on how such review 
should proceed can only be found in a political theory of the rule of law” (De Ville (n 100) 43 
(footnote omitted)).
127 See Vile Constitutionalism and the Separation of Powers (1998) ch 13 on a separation of powers 
consisting of four branches and functions.
128 Mullan (n 111) 51-55.
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evolved in Canada is subject to criticism,
129
 strongly suggesting that the adoption of 
any conception of deference should proceed with caution.
Arguably, Allan is deference’s severest critic, questioning even the possibility of 
a theory of deference.
130
 While Davis, for instance, asserts that deference in South 
Africa is not informed by the correct legal context, ie constitutional democracy 
and a human rights culture, Allan is sceptical of the very enterprise of judicial 
deference, arguing that “[t]here is no logical space for any free-standing doctrine 
of deference”.
131 That Allan is sceptical of deference as a doctrine is quite clear 
and should be emphasised, since many of Allan’s critics do not acknowledge this 
fundamental point.
132
In relation to a specific case before the court, Allan says that the scope of 
judicial review and of administrative discretion cannot be determined or balanced 
in the abstract, without considering the applicable legal questions in all the 
circumstances.
133
 In other words: “Insofar as talk of ‘deference’ promises to short-
circuit such analysis, suggesting a direct linkage between deep-level constitutional 
theory and the resolution of particular rights-claims, it generates only confusion and 
misunderstanding.”
134
Allan characterises the factors which are indicative and supportive of a measure 
of due deference
135
 as “plainly external to the intrinsic quality of the decision under 
review”.
136 This is deeply problematic, because due deference requires of a court to 
evaluate the arguments before it in the light of the decision-maker’s characteristics 
instead of those of the decision
137
 and is tantamount to non-justiciability.
138
 One 
should add that the court considers only one party’s characteristics, a party to 
the proceedings with a direct interest in the outcome. In addition, deferring to 
administrative decision-makers on the basis of expertise or superior access to 
information compromises judicial independence and neutrality.
139
 The external 
questions are distinguished from the “internal questions of expert judgement 
and procedural diligence, as demonstrated in relation to the matter in issue”.
140
 
Anyhow, the criteria which make up a doctrine of deference are incorporated in 
“ordinary judicial procedures, which do not try to replicate ... decision-making 
129 The limitations of Canadian deference are also evinced by its recent modification: see Daly (n 111) 
15-17.
130 See Allan “Common law reason and the limits of judicial deference” in Dyzenhaus (ed) The Unity of 
Public Law (2004) 289-306; “Human rights and judicial review: a critique of ‘due deference’” 2006 
Cambridge Law Journal 671-695; “Deference, defiance, and doctrine: defining the limits of judicial 
review” 2010 University of Toronto Law Journal 41-59; “Judicial deference and judicial review: legal 
doctrine and legal theory” 2011 Law Quarterly Review 96-117.
131 Allan (n 130 (2006)) 694. See Allan (n 130 (2004)) 305-306.
132 Allan (n 130 (2011)) 97-100.
133 Allan (n 130 (2006)) 676; (n 130 (2010)) 49. Regarding the primacy of context, see the Bato Star case 
(n 4) par 45; Mullan (n 111) 51. See also Jowell (n 121) 598-599, where he contends that, regarding 
institutional capacity, “there is no magic legal or other formula to identify the ‘discretionary area of 
judgment’ available to the reviewed body” (599) (footnote omitted). 
134 Allan (n 130 (2006)) 676.
135 Such as the decision-maker’s expertise or thorough procedures. See Allan (n 130 (2006)) 687-688.
136 Allan (n 130 (2006)) 688. See Allan (n 130 (2010)) 51.
137 Allan (n 130 (2006)) 688.
138 Allan (n 130 (2006)) 689.
139 Allan (n 130 (2004)) 289-290.
140 Allan (n 130 (2010)) 59.
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processes”,
141
 and in the distinction between appeal and review, which prevents 
judges substituting their own decisions for those of administrative decision-makers. 
Judicial review’s emphasis on the context of the decision also incorporates these 
criteria.
142
 The courts’ main concern must be the reasons for the decision given the 
circumstances, in line with a “legal culture of justification”.143
A further concern is that deference contributes to a misleading rhetoric of judicial 
restraint. Lenta explains that, in South Africa, “judicial decisions are punctuated by 
a rhetoric of restraint that is intended to allay concerns about the court’s usurpation 
of political functions that fall properly within the domain of the legislature or the 
executive”.
144
 Nevertheless, the constitutional court is attacked from two sides.
145
 
On the one hand, when the constitutional court refrains from entering into the 
political realm it is criticised for not protecting socio-economic rights sufficiently. 
On the other hand, when it allegedly trespasses onto the functions of the legislature 
or executive it is accused of usurping their functions, which is undemocratic 
and, hence, illegitimate behaviour.
146
 In other words, the constitutional court is 
simultaneously accused of both exercising too little and too much restraint. Courts, 
instead of articulating the constitutional foundation from which they intervene with 
administrative decisions and “sensing that they are on thinner constitutional ground 
in substantive review than on procedural review, do all they can to cover their tracks 
by laying false clues and donning elaborate camouflage”,147 such as the employment 
of a rhetoric of deference.
3.4 Deference, the separation of powers, and the question of a fourth branch
The strategy of “camouflage” is also apparent when the rhetoric of deference is 
contrasted with the separation of powers. Deference is often associated with the 
doctrine of separation of powers. Quite how deference or respect relates to the 
separation of powers is uncertain. O’Regan J says that deference flows from the 
separation of powers,
148
 but what this means remains unresolved. O’Regan J does 
not explain how deference derives from the separation of powers, or whether the 
ideas of the separation of powers simply support deference. Is the idea of deference 
an aspect of the separation of powers? Does deference supplement the separation 
of powers? Or is deference merely congruent with the separation of powers? These 
distinctions are relevant because they affect the content of deference and the way 
content can be given to deference.
For instance, the notion of checks and balances is additional to the doctrine of 
separation of powers because it is not necessarily an aspect of the pure doctrine, 
but it relies on the existence of the doctrine.
149
 Whereas the pure doctrine limits the 
power of any one branch, checks and balances ensure that the branches are directly 
answerable to one another. Thus, the idea of checks and balances modifies the pure 
141 Allan (n 130 (2006)) 692. See Allan (n 130 (2004)) 306; “What is really needed is a reminder that 
even a proportionality test need not (and generally should not) amount to the substitution of a judicial 
view for the public body’s opinion on the merits” Allan (n 130 (2010)) 43.
142 Allan (n 130 (2004)) 295, 297.
143 Allan (n 130 (2006)) 694 (footnote omitted).
144 Lenta “Judicial restraint and overreach” 2004 SAJHR 544.
145 Lenta (n 144) 544-545.
146 Lenta (n 144) 544-545.
147 Jowell (n 99) 454.
148 the Bato Star case (n 4) par 46.
149 See Maree Investigating an Alternative Administrative-Law System in South Africa (2013 diss U 
Stell) 112.
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doctrine and it complements the pure doctrine. In other words, conceptually the 
doctrine can exist without checks and balances, but the opposite is impossible. 
Likewise, the inquiry here is whether deference is an expression of the separation 
of powers itself, whether deference complements the doctrine, or whether deference 
merely relies on the separation of powers.
Apportioning functions to different branches in order to achieve certain normative 
objectives is precisely the concern of the separation of powers, even of the pure 
doctrine.
150
 In terms of the pure doctrine, the judiciary is not permitted to encroach 
upon the executive function. Therefore, if deference merely “consists of a judicial 
willingness to appreciate the legitimate and constitutionally-ordained province of 
administrative agencies”,
151
 implies “recognising the proper role of the Executive 
within the constitution”
152
 or “manifests the recognition that the law itself places 
certain administrative actions in the hands of the executive”,
153
 it is arguable that 
deference contributes nothing beyond the pure separation of powers.
Unlike the doctrine of the separation of powers, which addresses a wide range 
of political and legal relationships, deference focuses on, but is not limited to, the 
relationship between the public administration and the judiciary.
154
 This focus can 
be useful especially where a fourfold classification of state branches and functions 
in terms of the separation of powers is not employed. The executive branch and 
function has limited analytical potential because of its dual nature, which comprises 
both policy formulation and the implementation of policy and legislation. The 
executive branch includes both the cabinet and the public administration, powerful 
and divergent organs of state. The singular nature of the administration and its 
significance demands constitutional recognition. The constitution, however, 
provides only for the executive authority which is vested in the president
155
 and 
which the president exercises with the cabinet.
156
 In the light of the case for a 
separation of powers that accommodates at least four branches of government
157
 this 
is unfortunate, but not decisive. The constitution has been interpreted as providing a 
threefold distinction of government branches and functions.
158
 On this interpretation 
the constitution does not reflect the rise and importance of the public administration 
in the regulatory state. However, the constitution can be read to require a threefold 
division of branches and functions as a minimum requirement. This is plausible 
considering the constitution’s express recognition of the administration and its 
role.
159
If a fourth branch is introduced for purposes of state power analysis and 
regulation, then deference is largely an aspect of the separation of powers. The fact 
that deference focuses on a particular relationship within the separation of powers, 
namely the relationship between the public administration, as part of the executive, 
and the judiciary, will be largely subsumed by the addition of a fourth branch. 
150 See Maree (n 149) 112.
151 Hoexter (n 1) 501.
152 Bato Star case (n 4) par 48.
153 Phambili Fisheries case (n 34) par 50.
154 at least in the case law. One does not find the same deference rhetoric in judgments dealing with the 
relationship between the judiciary and legislature, although the term (without more) is at times also 
used in that context. 
155 s 85(1) of the constitution.
156 s 85(2) of the constitution.
157 See Maree (n 149) 47-53.
158 See South African Association of Personal Injury Lawyers v Heath 2001 1 SA 883 (CC) par 18-22.
159 See s 195 of the constitution.
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The fourth branch acknowledges that the public administration is distinguishable 
from the executive precisely because of its size and its role in performing day-
to-day functions. The exponential growth of the public administration’s mandate 
and impact justifies more analysis and more attention than under the traditional 
separation of powers. Nevertheless, deference can still make a valuable contribution 
by providing actual guidance on how to determine the competencies of the branches 
of government and the legitimate scope of checks and balances. Deference would 
serve to determine when scrutiny is appropriate, the standard or manner of scrutiny 
and how the court should intervene with administrative action.
If the threefold distinction of government branches and functions persists, then 
deference will have an even more valuable role to play. Under the threefold division, 
deference addresses the relationship between the public administration and the 
judiciary. Deference can play two roles: one, deference can draw attention to the 
importance of the public administration-judiciary relationship and, two, deference 
can serve as a gauge for when and how the judiciary should scrutinise administrative 
action and how it should intervene. Then it is a term that admits of the limits of 
the separation of powers, as presently understood in South Africa, and makes a 
contribution by providing guidance where the separation of powers is silent. For, 
although the separation of powers and checks and balances are concerned with the 
competencies of the branches of government, the separation of powers provides little 
guidance as to how competencies are determined, how they should be apportioned 
and how they should be balanced. This is where deference can contribute to the 
conceptual analysis of the relationship between the public administration and the 
judiciary.
3.5 A culture of justification and deference?
Dyzenhaus’s central argument concerning deference is that courts must take 
administrative decisions seriously.
160
 This amounts to a “new understanding of the 
deference principle”, namely, “deference as respect” as opposed to “deference as 
submission”.
161
 What the serious consideration of administrative determinations 
entails requires elaboration. Firstly, Dyzenhaus argues that judges should give 
“independent weight” to the reasoning of administrative tribunals.
162
 Secondly, this 
“acknowledgement” of administrative determinations nevertheless requires “the 
close judicial scrutiny of the tribunal’s reasoning”, which Dyzenhaus describes 
as a “curious feature”.
163
 Thirdly, such close consideration of administrative 
determinations raises the “paradox of rationality”, but close scrutiny and 
deference are compatible where deference is understood as respect, as opposed 
to submission.
164
 Finally, deference as respect changes the “interpretive context”: 
rather than relying on a positivist understanding of the law, the meaning of a statute 
is determined by reference to the best reasons for having that statute.
165
 Determining 
the meaning of a statute in this manner is a “reconstructive project” and the reasons 
may be “legislative, administrative or judicial”.
166
 According to Dyzenhaus, this 
160 Dyzenhaus (n 97) 303.
161 Dyzenhaus (n 97) 302-303.
162 Dyzenhaus (n 97) 302.
163 Dyzenhaus (n 97) 302. 
164 Dyzenhaus (n 97) 302. This suggests that deference is not limited to determining the intensity of 
review, cf Daly (n 111) ch 4, nor does close scrutiny of the facts exclude deference.
165 Dyzenhaus (n 97) 303.
166 Dyzenhaus (n 97) 303.
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change in the “interpretive context” makes a significant difference to a court’s range 
of decisions.
167
In addition to the implications of deference as respect, Dyzenhaus describes the 
nature of his conception of deference: “Deference as respect ... provides an ideal 
which can inform an attempt to rearticulate the relationship between the legislature, 
the courts and the administration in such a way that the courts retain a legitimate role 
as the ultimate authority on the interpretation of the law.”
168 Significantly, deference 
as respect emphasises the relationship between the branches of state.
169
 Therefore, 
Dyzenhaus does not merely try to identify the functional sphere of each branch
170
 
and exceptions to that sphere.
171
 He goes further by pointing out that deference is 
concerned with the interaction between the branches and that this interaction can 
be shaped by deference. Although deference can inform the rearticulation of the 
relationship, deference does not necessarily constitute the rearticulation itself.
172
 He 
also explains the rationale for this argument: factors such as the rule of law, equality 
and democracy affect the relationship and must inform the relationship.
173
 Thus 
factors external but related to the separation of powers and checks and balances 
inform the relationship. This reinforces the argument in favour of evaluating the 
administration, as well as judicial review, as a component of an administrative-
law system, rather than compartmentalising the branches and their functions as an 
end in itself. The wording in the preceding quotation (“can inform an attempt to 
rearticulate the relationship”) also suggests that the “attempt” is yet to be made and 
that the role of deference, at this stage at least, is relatively modest as an informing 
ideal.
Thus, deference as respect is a guiding principle rather than a legal rule.
174
 However, 
deference is limited to the extent that the judiciary remains the “ultimate authority 
on the interpretation of the law”.
175
 The status of the judiciary is thereby preserved, 
but the scope of legal argument is broadened and the manner of establishing that 
argument is modified.
Therefore, attempts to describe deference as equating administrative and 
judicial conclusions of the law are incongruent with Dyzenhaus’s position. 
Likewise, arguments where courts are required only to cast a cursory glance over 
administrative determinations are also inconsistent with Dyzenhaus’s position. 
The emphasis is rather on the value of administrative arguments, instead of the 
author of the argument. It is the judicial approach to administrative decisions, when 
operating in a vacuum, which is challenged: the emphasis is on which reasons are 
relevant and how courts should assess reasons, rather than the source of the reasons. 
The emphasis is on what constitutes valid legal argument, rather than treating 
167 Dyzenhaus (n 97) 303-304. Taking administrative determinations seriously, in the sense advocated 
by Dyzenhaus, reinforces both red-light and green-light theories of administrative law. On the one 
hand, administrative acts are scrutinised closely and the administration is required to justify its acts. 
This can be characterised as a form of control. On the other hand, the administration, as the branch 
specialised in administrative matters, is entitled to justify its actions with reference to the reasons 
that best justify the decision, even if those reasons are administrative or other reasons.
168 Dyzenhaus (n 97) 303.
169 Dyzenhaus argues that only deference as respect can “rearticulate the proper relationship between 
the legislature, administrative agencies and the courts” (n 97) 286.
170 on the basis of the separation of powers or legislative authorisation.
171 in the form of checks and balances, for instance.
172 The South African courts seem to regard deference itself as the rearticulation of the relationship.
173 Dyzenhaus (n 97) 303-305.
174 Dyzenhaus (n 97) 286.
175 Dyzenhaus (n 97) 303.
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the administration leniently. Dyzenhaus advocates an integrated approach where 
democracy, the rule of law and equality play a role in forming judicial decision-
making. Thus, the emphasis is on how courts treat administrative arguments, rather 
than on how courts treat the administration. 
Dyzenhaus does not claim that his exposition of deference as such can provide 
answers in particular cases, on the scope of reasonableness, for instance. Decisions 
must be “supportable”, not necessarily supported.
176
 Where the administration is 
concerned, courts must determine whether a decision is “supportable by the reasons 
it [the administrative tribunal] in fact and could in principle have offered”
177
 and 
“even if the reasons in fact given do not seem wholly adequate to support the 
decision, the court must first seek to supplement them before it seeks to subvert 
them”.
178
 Thus, where administrative decisions are before the court, the court goes 
to some length to determine whether the decisions are supportable or justifiable, 
but does not thereby evade close judicial scrutiny. The court plays a pro-active role.
On the whole, Dyzenhaus introduces a claim similar to Hoexter’s:
179
 they both 
discuss in broad terms what deference should be and why, rather than what deference 
implies in a particular case. Hoexter also regards Dyzenhaus’s contribution in this 
light, referring to his “exploration of the idea of deference”.
180
 Nevertheless, in cases 
like the Bato Star case, deference is drawn upon in a manner that suggests Dyzenhaus 
and Hoexter formulated factors that are directly applicable to reasonableness review 
of administrative action. In doing so, the South African courts have misunderstood 
these writers, adopting their conceptions of deference erroneously.
Whether the judiciary can simply take administrative determinations of the law 
seriously from one day to the next is debatable. At least, it cannot be assumed that 
the judiciary has the capacity to effect such a change by the mere assumption of 
a new approach, other things being equal. Simply obliging judges to take these 
determinations “seriously” will not necessarily solve problems such as the scope 
of the judicial function or the tension between the judiciary and the administration. 
How are judges without any required training or experience in public administration, 
economics or political theory supposed to take these determinations seriously? Is it 
any different from expecting an administrator to judge a complex legal case? Taking 
administrative determinations seriously amounts to a change in legal culture, ie “a 
new imagination and self-reflection about legal method, analysis and reasoning”;181 
this should extend to institutional innovation.
Dyzenhaus does not advocate taking the administrator’s word at face value: rather, 
administrative and other justifications require recognition as legally legitimate 
justifications for certain decisions; and the courts are to play a constructive role 
in formulating such justifications. Administrative determinations form part of the 
context within which the legal validity of administrative decisions is assessed. 
This is the core of deference as respect, rather than avoiding engagement with 
administrative decisions or reserving functional spheres for other branches. This 
approach does not point in one direction or another when applied in the abstract, as 
176 Dyzenhaus (n 97) 304-305.
177 Dyzenhaus (n 97) 305. Dyzenhaus reiterates this point: in the event of recourse to a court “that 
recourse must be on the basis of the question whether the tribunal’s decision was supportable by the 
reasons it in fact and could in principle have offered” (305). See De Ville (n 100) 53: “Asking whether 
a decision is justifiable is also different from asking whether a decision is justified.”
178 Dyzenhaus (n 97) 304 (emphasis added).
179 in her article, Hoexter (n 1).
180 Hoexter (n 1) 501 n 79 (emphasis added).
181 Klare “Legal culture and transformative constitutionalism” 1998 SAJHR 146 156.
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would be the case where the seniority of the administrator plays a role regardless of 
the facts of a particular case. 
Therefore, both Dyzenhaus and Hoexter call for a developed theory of deference, 
but do not claim to have formulated it. Instead, they describe the nature of the 
deference they have in mind. This is significant in the South African context in 
particular because their discussions have been employed as final claims about 
deference. In addition, deference as respect should be understood in the light of 
Mureinik’s “culture of justification”. Dyzenhaus says that the “idea of a legal culture 
of justification ... is of crucial importance to [his] own work”.182 He specifically 
acknowledges his debt to Mureinik
183
 and explains that his “thesis depends on a 
theory which connects the value of equality with the rule of law through the idea of 
a legal culture of justification”.184 Considering the central role of the idea of a legal 
culture of justification, arguments suggesting that deference entails a superficial 
or arm’s length approach to the administration seem misconstrued. Dyzenhaus 
underlines the importance of deference as a democratic principle:
“[deference as respect] adopts the assumption that what justifies all public power is the ability of 
its incumbents to offer adequate reasons for the decisions which affect those subject to them. The 
difference between mere legal subjects and citizens is the democratic right of the latter to require an 
accounting for acts of public power.
The legislature, the administration and the courts are then just strands in a web of public justification. 
The courts’ special role is as an ultimate enforcement mechanism for such justification. When 
administrative tribunals make decisions on points of law, those subject to the decision are entitled 
to require that the tribunal should offer reasons that in fact justify the decision. Should they not 
be satisfied, recourse to the courts should be available. But that recourse must be on the basis of 
the question whether the tribunal’s decision was supportable by the reasons it in fact and could in 
principle have offered.”
185
Allan also emphasises the role of a culture of justification as he argues against a 
doctrine of deference. It is perhaps surprising that he refers to Dyzenhaus with 
approval. Allan’s central argument is that a freestanding doctrine of deference is not 
only undesirable, but virtually a theoretical impossibility.
186
 He assesses the cogency 
specifically of a freestanding, independent doctrine or theory, which determines 
the scope of review and can limit the judiciary’s control of the political branches 
regardless of the merits of the particular case.
He is adamant that factors external to the case at hand, which delineate the 
functional spheres of the branches of state, are inherent to the judicial review 
182 Dyzenhaus (n 97) 279; see De Ville (n 100) 41. Given the centrality of a culture of justification 
to administrative justice (see Corder “The development of administrative law in South Africa” 
in Quinot (ed) Administrative Justice in South Africa: An Introduction (2015) 2), the judiciary’s 
insistence that it is not well placed to ascertain complex, policy-laden or polycentric matters (but 
only when the administration is involved, it seems) does not bode well for the ordinary citizen’s 
expectations to have the state truly justify its actions to its citizens. If the courts cannot even 
require the administration to account for its actions in detail, then the citizen acting outside of the 
court might well have to be satisfied with far less justification. If the judiciary can enforce rights 
only in a diluted fashion, the constitutional imperatives of legality, openness and transparency are 
compromised.
183 Dyzenhaus (n 97) 279, 302 n 62.
184 Dyzenhaus (n 97) 302 (footnote omitted). 
185 Dyzenhaus (n 97) 305.
186 Allan (n 130 (2006)) 672, 675, 694. Allan certainly has critics, some of whom seem to qualify as 
detractors. For Allan’s response to his critics see Allan (n 130 (2011)). Also see Daly (n 111) 26-35.
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process
187
 and so dependent on context that they have little, if any, meaning in the 
abstract. Citing Dyzenhaus, Allan argues that
“[i]f the protection of individual rights is to be compatible with the exercise by public authorities 
of discretionary powers to act in furtherance of the general interest, there must be some division of 
competence between the legal and political branches of state. The courts must cede to Parliament 
and government an appropriate sphere of decision-making autonomy, protected from judicial 
interference. The boundaries of that sphere of autonomy, however, cannot be settled independently 
of all the circumstances of the particular case; for only the facts of the particular case can reveal 
the extent to which any individual right is implicated and the degree to which relevant public 
interests may justify the right’s curtailment or qualification. The balance of judgment, as between 
judicial opinion and that of the legislature or public officials, will depend on the range of discretion 
applicable in all the circumstances: judges should ‘defer’ to the conclusions of other persons only to 
the extent that the reasons offered in support of those conclusions prove persuasive. There is, then, 
no means of defining the scope of judicial powers, or prescribing the limits of official discretion, as 
regards the details of any particular case, without examination of the specific legal issues arising in 
all the circumstances.”
188
Thus, Allan recognises a sphere of administrative autonomy.
189
 He also recognises 
that factors, such as the relative expertise of the decision-maker, are relevant in the 
determination of constitutional boundaries. However, such factors have meaning 
only in relation to the particular facts of a case.
190
 
It is noteworthy that Allan consistently refers to Dyzenhaus with approval,
191
 
since Dyzenhaus is generally cited as an advocate
192
 of deference and Allan an 
opponent
193 of deference. Notably, Allan limits his critique to “an independent 
theory or doctrine of deference”,
194
 even though this does not necessarily explain 
Allan’s reliance on Dyzenhaus. Allan’s endorsement of Dyzenhaus’s position, and 
by implication deference as respect, supports the reading of Dyzenhaus set out 
187 Allan (n 130 (2006)) 679-680, 694.
188 Allan (n 130 (2006)) 676 (footnote omitted).
189 Allan (n 130 (2006)) 673. In order to argue that administrative autonomy has been infringed upon 
by the judiciary, one would have to determine the content and scope of the administrative function. 
The administration has a constitutional mandate to perform an administrative function; therefore, 
the independence of the administration, in terms of the separation of powers, is limited to the 
performance of that function. Likewise, the judiciary is constrained by the separation of powers, 
as well as checks and balances, to remain separate, both institutionally and functionally, from the 
legislature and executive. In other words, the separation of powers protects the independence of 
the branches so far as their relative functions are concerned. The legislative function is protected 
from executive or judicial interference. Although the content of a particular function itself and 
the boundaries between the functions are difficult to determine, a branch is shielded from undue 
interference with its own function. When the administration strays into the executive sphere by 
formulating policy, for instance, the administration cannot rely even on its demonstrated expertise or 
its actually reasonable assessment of the information before it. Here, expertise in the administrative 
function itself is all that is relevant. Where the administration employs experts, such as economists 
or actuarial scientists, the administration does not thereby become an expert in economics or 
actuarial science, nor are those functions necessarily part of the administrative function. Though 
their findings may play a critical role, the administrative function relates to how that information 
is utilised in order to realise policy and implement legislation. Thus deference is only due to the 
administration in relation to the administrative function. 
190 Allan (n 130 (2006)) 690.
191 See, for instance, Allan (n 130 (2006)) 676 n 16, 694 n 69; Allan (n 130 (2010)) 47, 54, 57.
192 See, for instance, Taggart “Proportionality, deference, Wednesbury” 2008 New Zealand Law Review 
423 455.
193 See, for instance, De Ville (n 100) 41.
194 Allan (n 130 (2006)) 672 (emphasis in original).
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above. Thus, Dyzenhaus and Allan do not stand in opposition to one another and 
can be read as complementary.
Furthermore, Allan indicates that his critics do not seem to disagree with his 
contention that these factors are dependent on context.
195
 However, if they were 
assessed in isolation from the facts, Allan contends that the judiciary would be 
compromising its independence, impartiality, neutrality and objectivity.
196
 Where 
deference is employed as a separate enquiry, independently of the facts,197 “[t]he 
effect is precisely the same as the application of a doctrine of non-justiciability”.
198
Allan’s position can be read as congruent to an extent with the South African 
position in the Bato Star case.
199
 O’Regan J makes it clear that institutional 
considerations cannot be decisive:
200
 
“Section 2 of the Act requires the decision-maker to have regard to201 a range of factors which are 
to some extent in tension. It is clear from this that Parliament intended to confer a discretion upon 
the relevant decision-maker to make a decision in the light of all the relevant factors. That decision 
must strike a reasonable equilibrium between the different factors but the factors themselves are not 
determinative of any particular equilibrium. Which equilibrium is the best in the circumstances is 
left to the decision-maker. The Court’s task is merely to determine whether the decision made is one 
which achieves a reasonable equilibrium in the circumstances.”202
In the final analysis, Allan’s rejection of factors operating in isolation from the 
facts, such as those identified by Hunt that include the decision-maker’s “relative 
expertise” and democratic accountability,
203
 is in line with Dyzenhaus’s plea for 
courts to take administrative determinations seriously and to justify incidences of 
public power. Allan’s position is also congruent with a culture of justification.204
4 A decade and a half of deference, what next?
4.1 Calling for a debate on deference, again
Evidently, the topic of deference characterises pronouncements on the relationship 
between the administration and the judiciary. In administrative-law review, 
195 Allan (n 130 (2011)) 3 n 15.
196 Allan (n 130 (2011)) 116.
197 The so-called “two-stage analysis”, Allan (n 130 (2011)) 108.
198 Allan (n 130 (2011)) 108.
199 the Bato Star case (n 4) par 48-54.
200 “A Court should ... give due weight to findings of fact and policy decisions made by those with 
special expertise and experience in the field. The extent to which a Court should give weight to these 
considerations will depend upon the character of the decision itself, as well as on the identity of the 
decision-maker. A decision that requires an equilibrium to be struck between a range of competing 
interests or considerations and which is to be taken by a person or institution with specific expertise 
in that area must be shown respect by the Courts. Often a power will identify a goal to be achieved, 
but will not dictate which route should be followed to achieve that goal. In such circumstances 
a Court should pay due respect to the route selected by the decision-maker. This does not mean 
however that where the decision is one which will not reasonably result in the achievement of the 
goal, or which is not reasonably supported on the facts or not reasonable in the light of the reasons 
given for it, a Court may not review that decision. A Court should not rubber-stamp an unreasonable 
decision simply because of the complexity of the decision or the identity of the decision-maker” the 
Bato Star case (n 4) par 48.
201 emphasis in the original.
202 the Bato Star case (n 4) par 49 (our emphasis).
203 Allan (n 130 (2006)) 687.
204 Allan (n 130 (2006)) 694.
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deference has developed into the courts’ main descriptor of this relationship,
205
 and 
influential authors such as Dyzenhaus, Hoexter and Daly regard deference as pivotal 
to the development of a new, integrated approach to adjudication that reflects the 
role of the administration in the modern state.
206
 
In South Africa, deference is derived from the functional spheres and 
characteristics of the branches of state, which are largely a separation-of-powers 
concern. Quite how deference differs from the ideas of the separation of powers 
is unclear, especially in South African case law, which all but equates the two. 
The prominence of deference reinforces the notion of a fourth branch within the 
separation of powers. Although the new terminology of deference might highlight a 
particular aspect of the separation of powers, deference as such can neither provide 
integrated solutions to problems associated with the relationship between the 
administration and judiciary nor describe its nature. Nevertheless, the courts raise 
deference without even acknowledging the nature of their respective functions. 
Hoexter called for a debate on deference in the year 2000 for two reasons:
207
 
to determine an appropriate, integrated role for judicial review and to formulate 
a theory of intervention and non-intervention. This debate not only has yet to 
take place, it has hardly begun. As far as the South African courts are concerned 
deference amounts to nothing more than the broad strokes identified by Hoexter 
and, as applied, provides little more than the pure separation of powers.
Deference “flows” from the separation of powers according to the Bato Star case. 
However, despite the courts’ apparent enthusiasm for a principle of deference, the 
actual role of deference is not only obscure, but seems merely to repeat the language 
of the pure separation of powers. This approach threatens to descend into a method 
characterised by formalism and conceptualism. Instead of grappling with questions 
such as the appropriate roles of the administration and the judiciary or the content 
of administrative justice,
208
 courts invoke deference in a manner that suggests that 
the notion and its application are straightforward. On the basis of factors such as 
expertise, democratic legitimacy, seniority and complexity courts avoid substantive 
argument on the implications of the constitution for the judicial and administrative 
functions. Thus, deference as applied is largely empty. By relying on this “empty” 
version of deference courts evade engagement with principles and considerations 
that inform their function and relationship with the administration, including extra-
legal considerations such as political theory. As a result, potential doctrinal and 
institutional innovations that the new constitutional dispensation may require are 
left unexplored. This is precisely what calls for a new legal culture have sought to 
avoid.
In our view, after a decade and a half of deference, we are no closer to formulating 
principles of intervention and non-intervention than when Hoexter first alerted us 
to the need for such development in South Africa. As a first step in response to this 
position, it is necessary to reiterate Hoexter’s call for a debate. This debate does not 
take place in a vacuum; deference is not self-explanatory. Therefore, the context and 
conceptual framework within which the deference debate is to take place is sketched 
below. Without expanding on the principles and factors which are foundational to 
deference, the content of deference cannot be ascertained.
205 the Logbro case (n 26) par 21-22; the Phambili Fisheries case (n 34) par 50; the Bato Star case (n 4) 
par 48.
206 See Dyzenhaus (n 97); Hoexter (n 1); Daly (n 111).
207 See Hoexter (n 1).
208 See Klaaren “Redlight, greenlight” 1999 SAJHR 209-217.
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4.2 An integrated function for judicial review
A point of departure in this debate must be the development of an integrated function 
for judicial review as called for by Hoexter. This entails that judicial review is one of a 
variety of methods to safeguard the right to administrative justice.
209
 The Promotion 
of Administrative Justice Act supports this approach by establishing judicial review 
as a complementary mechanism in the pursuit of administrative justice. Section 7 of 
the act obliges the courts to require applicants to exhaust internal remedies before 
applying for judicial review: “no court or tribunal shall review an administrative 
action in terms of this Act unless any internal remedy provided for in any other law 
has first been exhausted”.210 An integrated role for judicial review is necessitated 
by the high cost, long duration and formal procedures of litigation. Litigation also 
has a narrow focus on the dispute between the parties and courts are limited to the 
arguments presented by the parties. 
Therefore, other forms of effective promotion of administrative justice must be 
investigated as part of the deference debate. This includes both potential and existing 
forms of promoting administrative justice. If judicial review is integrated, in actual 
fact, then deference is a function of the administrative-law system as a whole, in 
the sense that where protection increases within the administration or elsewhere, 
judicial review will arguably be informed by such a development. However, if 
the administrative-law system has not adapted to protect the interests of private 
individuals in ways other than judicial review, then the courts cannot take a back 
seat. Potentially, where the administration fails to reflect the constitutional vision 
of administrative justice, judicial review could retain its prominence. In this view, 
judicial intervention or non-intervention turns on the extent to which administrative 
justice is achieved by the administrative process as a whole. This approach may be 
aligned with O’Regan J’s statements in the Bato Star case regarding the need, on the 
one hand, to treat administrative choices with “the appropriate respect”, and, on the 
other, to retain judicial oversight of the reasonableness of the decision.
211
 The court’s 
assessment of the reasonableness in law of the impugned administrative action will 
determine whether such action complies with the constraints of administrative 
justice, which will inform the court’s approach to intervention or non-intervention 
in the case. 
By considering the administrative-law system as a whole, attention is drawn to 
the role of judicial review within the system as one form of control among others. 
This emphasises the value of the concept of the administrative-law system as well 
as the relationship as a conceptual tool for analysis and comparison. Considering 
jurisdictional control, ie legal control of administrative acts, provides a far clearer 
picture of the protection available than simply discussing the judiciary’s role in 
isolation. Thus, an integrated principle of deference should take stock of the system 
as a whole and not merely of the role of the judiciary in a vacuum.
212
4.3 Constitutional context
The concept of deference is yet to be contextualised in South Africa, particularly 
within our human-rights context.
213
 Dyzenhaus’s conception of deference as respect 
209 See Quinot “Regulating administrative action” in Quinot (n 182) 95-97.
210 s 7(2)(a) of PAJA.
211 the Bato Star case (n 4) par 48.
212 S 7(2) of PAJA can support such an approach to administrative justice.
213 See Davis (n 119) 39.
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is informed by the Canadian constitution and principles such as the rule of law 
and equality as understood in the Canadian context. Thus, deference as respect, as 
conceived by Dyzenhaus, is an “indigenous” theory, to use Mullan’s wording; it is 
integrated within the Canadian system.
Such a process of integration is yet to take place in South Africa. An appropriate 
theory of deference requires an assessment of deference in relation to considerations 
such as constitutional supremacy, Mureinik’s culture of justification, Klare’s 
transformative constitutionalism, and South Africa’s human rights culture. These 
considerations are integral to a South African understanding of deference, whatever 
it may turn out to be, especially given the primacy of equality and democracy in 
the constitution.
214 The exercise of linking the rule of law and equality to deference, 
as understood by Dyzenhaus, must be replicated in the South African context. 
Deference as respect cannot simply be imported uncritically. Constitutional 
supremacy implies that the separation of powers, and by implication deference, must 
be informed by the content of administrative justice; it is not for an undeveloped 
“theory” of deference to determine the scope of administrative justice. Therefore an 
essential component of the debate must be the content of administrative justice and 
the minimum protection it provides.
Within the distinct South African constitutional context it is also essential to 
assess the link between deference and the developing doctrine of legality.
215
 It may 
be that the relationship between administrative justice and legality is a function of 
a theory of deference. That is, the way in which courts decide to subject executive 
action (viewed broadly within the traditional tripartite division of the separation 
of powers) either to administrative justice requirements or to (lesser) legality 
requirements may flow from a theory of deference. Here deference influences both 
questions of justiciability (to what extent is the action at issue subject to judicial 
scrutiny?) and questions of standard of review (what does reasonableness review 
entail in this particular case?). 
The link between legality and deference is borne out by the remarks of the 
majority in Masetlha v President of the Republic of South Africa
216
 where the court 
stated:  
“It would not be appropriate to constrain executive power to requirements of procedural fairness, 
which is a cardinal feature in reviewing administrative action. These powers to appoint and to 
dismiss are conferred specially upon the President for the effective business of government and, in 
this particular case, for the effective pursuit of national security. In Premier, Mpumalanga [Premier, 
Mpumalanga v Executive Committee, Association of State-Aided Schools, Eastern Transvaal 1999 
2 SA 91 (CC); 1999 2 BCLR 151 (CC)], this court has had occasion to express itself on whether to 
impose a requirement of procedural fairness in the following terms:
‘In determining what constitutes procedural fairness in a given case, a court should be slow to 
impose obligations upon government which will inhibit its ability to make and implement policy 
effectively (a principle well recognised in our common law and that of other countries). As a 
young democracy facing immense challenges of transformation, we cannot deny the importance 
of the need to ensure the ability of the Executive to act efficiently and promptly’ [the Premier, 
Mpumalanga case par 41].” 
214 Again the connections between political theory, context, institutional arrangements and particular 
rules are apparent.
215 On the development of legality in relation to administrative justice, see Hoexter “The enforcement 
of an official promise: form, substance and the constitutional court” 2015 SALJ 207 219-223.
216 2008 1 SA 566 (CC) par 77.
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This quotation illustrates a simultaneous concern with respect for the executive 
function (ie deference) and the appropriate basis and standard upon which to review 
the action (ie legality versus administrative justice). 
4.4 Respect for administrative determinations of the law or cogency of reasoning
Dyzenhaus’s entreaty to take administrative determinations of the law seriously 
requires further examination. First of all, what are administrative determinations? 
Secondly, what are the implications of constitutional supremacy and section 172 of 
the constitution for Dyzenhaus’s contention that courts remain the ultimate authority 
on legal interpretation? Thirdly, what is the relationship between administrative 
action, as defined by the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act, and administrative 
determinations of the law? Finally, taking administrative determinations seriously 
requires at least the capacity to do so. Courts often point out that they are not 
well placed to consider polycentric issues. How are courts to take administrative 
determinations seriously if they are unqualified to do so?
4.5 Deference as a free-standing principle or informing principle or both
The extent to which deference is already part of the law should be acknowledged. The 
distinction between appeal and review is a form of respect towards the administrative 
function. The definition of “administrative action”217 also limits the application of 
administrative law and thereby the purview of the courts, although this may be 
sidestepped in certain circumstances by relying on the constitutional principle of 
legality.
218
 The development of legality review is thus a key consideration in the 
deference debate as outlined above. The variable standard of review, which excludes 
correctness or the substitution of the court’s view for the administration’s, also 
respects the administration. Section 6(2)( f )(ii) of the Promotion of Administrative 
Justice Act provides for a rationality test, and section 6(2)(h) provides for the general 
reasonableness test. Even though the latter does allow for proportionality
219
 this 
standard maintains the distinction between appeal and review. 
The remedies available to the courts are also limited. Section 38 of the constitution 
authorises the courts to “grant appropriate relief” where “a right in the Bill of Rights 
has been infringed or threatened”. Section 172 authorises the courts to “make 
any order that is just and equitable”. Similarly, section 8(1) of the Promotion of 
Administrative Justice Act provides that the courts “may grant any order that is just 
and equitable”. Seemingly these provisions grant wide and far-reaching powers to 
the courts. However, only in “exceptional cases” may the court replace or change 
the administrative decision or order the administration to pay compensation.
220
 The 
scope of remedies reflects the distinction between appeal and review and is also an 
incidence of grounds of review or of just and equitable remedies. In this context 
deference is not a free-standing legal rule that can be invoked by courts to justify a 
particular outcome in the case. The role of deference is to inform the development 
of specific legal rules, for example in the form of grounds of review or of just and 
equitable remedies.  
The question regarding the particular role of deference vis-à-vis rules of positive 
law leads to the further inquiry “when does deference apply?” At this stage it 
217 s 1 of PAJA.
218 However, this strategy also is limited.
219 See Kidd “Reasonableness” in Quinot (n 182) 180-184, 190-191.
220 s 8(1)(c)(ii)(aa) and (bb).
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seems that deference permeates the entire legal landscape, from the allocation of 
constitutional competences to the application of particular rules and the formulation 
of remedies. Deference plays a role in the determination of justiciability, eg the 
definition of administration action;221 deference determines the type of scrutiny 
available to the courts, ie review instead of appeal; deference determines the 
standard of review, ie rationality, reasonableness or proportionality, or even legality; 
and the scope of remedies is influenced by deference. Deference also influences the 
interpretation of legislation,
222
 and deference is constituted by factors external to 
the facts of the particular case such as expertise, complexity, democratic legitimacy 
and discretion.
223
 
4.6 Deference and the separation of powers
The link between deference and the separation of powers is problematic if not 
questionable. As we have seen, O’Regan J expressly links deference to the separation 
of powers in the Bato Star case, relying inter alia on Lord Hoffmann’s opinion in 
the ProLife Alliance case. However, Lord Hoffmann’s position is not that deference 
is underpinned by the separation of powers, as suggested by O’Regan J, but that 
deference is empty in the sense that the allocation of functions by the courts is 
nothing more than a legal question in terms of the separation of powers and the 
rule of law. In addition, Dyzenhaus and Daly do not support the emphasis on the 
separation of powers. 
Daly points out that “developing general principles of judicial review from the 
separation of power is a difficult task”.224 He nevertheless 
“explore[s] four lines of reasoning which might lead to the conclusion that the separation of powers 
can compel the adoption of a doctrine of curial deference. Each line of reasoning will be rejected in 
turn, but they are not to be dismissed out of hand: each contains a seed of truth which will flourish 
under different conditions.”
225
 
The four lines of reasoning are checks and balances, curial deference as discipline, 
automatic deference and curial deference as enhancing the legislature’s power.
226
 In 
the final analysis, Daly states that “the tripartite division tells us little or nothing 
about the functions that are properly assigned to each branch”.
227
 This is even more 
so with political organs and functions that have developed more recently, such as 
the administration. Instead, Daly’s theory of deference is founded on the delegation 
of powers to the administration by the legislature and “practical justifications” for 
deference.
228
 For Dyzenhaus a theory of deference is based on democratic principles, 
the rule of law understood as equality and a “culture of justification”.229 The act of 
delegation will carry less weight in a system of constitutional supremacy than of 
parliamentary sovereignty, and practical justifications must be identified in context.
We do not attempt to argue that the separation of powers should be disregarded 
in relation to deference. Rather, the separation of powers, as such and without 
221 s 1 of PAJA.
222 See Daly (n 111) ch 2.
223 See Daly (n 111) ch 3.
224 Daly (n 111) 44-45.
225 Daly (n 111) 45.
226 Daly (n 111) 45-48.
227 Daly (n 111) 44.
228 Daly (n 111) 5, ch 2, ch 3.
229 Dyzenhaus (n 97) 302-305.
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more, does not and cannot give content to a fully-fledged theory of deference. 
The separation of powers certainly informs deference. However, as illustrated by 
Dyzenhaus and Daly, the normative objectives that shape the separation of powers are 
more relevant to deference than the pure doctrine or trias politica. This emphasises 
the interrelatedness between political theory, context and the administrative-law 
system, which serves as the foundation of the deference debate.
5 Conclusion
Thus, deference seems to be quite undeveloped in the South African context. Even 
where deference has a long history and established role, in Canada for example, 
deference as such is contested and critiqued. However, on a close reading of Hoexter, 
Dyzenhaus and Allan there is significant potential for a principle of deference. 
Without compromising on a “culture of justification” and context, deference can 
make at least three vital contributions. Firstly, deference can emphasise and embody 
the distinct relationship between the administration and the judiciary within the 
separation of powers paradigm.
230
 Secondly, on Dyzenhaus’s interpretation, 
deference implies that courts should take administrative determinations of the 
law seriously. This involves a change in legal culture and, arguably, institutional 
innovation. Above all, it requires an appreciation of the administration and the 
administrative function and the capacity to do so. Finally, deference can facilitate a 
discussion on the appropriate role for judicial review within the administrative-law 
system, as proposed by Hoexter in 2000. We reiterate that this is a discussion that is 
yet to take place, despite the enthusiasm of the South African courts for a rhetoric 
of deference.
SAMEVATTING
ANDERHALF DEKADE VAN GEREGTELIKE RESPEK
Sedert die publikasie van Hoexter se artikel in 2000 oor die toekoms van geregtelike hersiening van 
administratiewe handelinge, het Suid-Afrikaanse howe ’n retoriek van geregtelike respek met groot 
entoesiasme aangegryp in administratiefregtelike beregting. In toonaangewende uitsprake soos die 
Logbro-, die Bato Star- en die Foodcorp -sake het die hoër howe hul onderskeie uitsprake bereik met 
’n uitdruklike verwysing na “geregtelike respek” in die betrokke gevalle. Die outeurs argumenteer 
egter dat Hoexter nooit ten doel gehad het om ’n volledig ontwikkelde leerstuk van geregtelike respek 
bekend te stel nie ten spyte van die howe se aanvaarding van haar “definisie” van geregtelike respek 
(“deference”). In teendeel, Hoexter het ’n beroep gedoen om ’n debat oor geregtelike respek. Sy het 
aan die hand gedoen dat die drasties gewysigde staatsregtelike bestel waarbinne geregtelike hersiening 
van administratiewe handelinge in Suid-Afrika nou plaasvind onder die Grondwet van die Republiek 
van Suid-Afrika, 1996 ’n heroorweging van die howe se rol vis-à-vis die administrasie in terme van die 
administratiefreg noodsaak. Nietemin het die grondwetlike hof in die Bato Star-saak Hoexter se idee 
van geregtelike respek toegepas asof dit ’n gevestigde regsbeginsel was en het die hof die terminologie 
van “deference as respect” aanvaar, met verwysing na Dyzenhaus se werk. 
Die outeurs staan anderhalf dekade later weer stil by Hoexter se 2000-artikel en doen ’n 
bestekopname van die ontwikkeling van geregtelike respek. Hierdie bydrae bied ’n noukeurige analise 
van Hoexter se artikel en van die hofuitsprake wat Hoexter se omskrywing van geregtelike respek 
oënskynlik aangeneem het. Op grond van hierdie ontleding bied die outeurs ’n interpretasie van 
Hoexter se oogmerke en vergelyk dit met die daaropvolgende reaksie op haar werk, veral deur die 
230 To an extent this is already the case, since the courts do not employ the rhetoric of deference to 
describe the expertise of the judiciary or the other branches of state and the respect their decisions 
and reasons should be accorded. If deference flowed from the separation of powers as a general 
principle one would expect the principle of deference to be equally valid between all branches of 
state.
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howe. Die outeurs kom na aanleiding van die ontleding tot die gevolgtrekking dat daar ’n kortsluiting 
bestaan tussen Hoexter se voorstel en die howe se hantering daarvan. Terwyl Hoexter op die behoefte 
aan ontwikkeling van ’n Suid-Afrikaanse opvatting van geregtelike respek gewys het, suggereer die 
howe se retoriek oor geregtelike respek dat daardie ontwikkeling reeds plaasgevind het. 
Die outeurs analiseer vervolgens ’n aantal ander skrywers se werk oor geregtelike respek en veral 
die oënskynlike oorsprong van die begrip in die Kanadese konteks waar Dyzenhaus die denkbeeld van 
“deference as respect” ontwikkel het. Teen die agtergrond van hierdie breër analise bied die outeurs 
hul interpretasie van die grondwetlike hof se omgang met die begrip “respek”. Hulle kom tot die 
gevolgtrekking dat na anderhalf dekade is die Suid-Afrikaanse reg nog niks nader aan die formulering 
van beginsels van inmenging en nie-inmenging deur die howe as toe Hoexter oorspronklik gewys het 
op die behoefte aan sodanige beginsels nie. Die gepaste reaksie is om Hoexter se versugting vir ’n 
indringende debat oor die onderwerp te herhaal.
LEGAL CERTAINTY HAS PRIORITY BEFORE THE INDIVIDUAL JUDGE’S MORAL 
BELIEFS
“Does this mean that in the context of pure economic loss the imposition of liability will depend on what 
every individual judge regards as fair and reasonable? I believe the answer to the last two questions 
must be ‘no’. Liability cannot depend on the idiosyncratic views of an individual judge. That would 
cloud the outcome of every case in uncertainty. In matters of contract, for example, this court has 
turned its face against the notion that judges can refuse to enforce a contractual provision purely on the 
basis that it offends their personal sense of fairness and equity. Because, so it was said, that notion will 
give rise to legal and commercial uncertainty (see eg Brisley v Drotsky 2002 4 SA 1 (SCA) (2002 12 
BCLR 1229) par 21-25; South African Forestry Co Ltd v York Timbers Ltd 2005 3 SA 323 (SCA) (2004 
4 All SA 168) par 27). I can see no reason why the same principle should not apply with equal force 
in matters of delict. A legal system in which the outcome of litigation cannot be predicted with some 
measure of certainty would fail in its purpose” – Fourway Haulage SA (Pty) Ltd v SA National Roads 
Agency Ltd 2009 2 SA 150 (SCA) 158D-F.
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